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TAXATION - INTEREST-FREE LOANS FROM A CORPORATION TO A
SHAREHOLDER
W. L. Hardee had a running loan account with a corporation
in which he was the majority shareholder.' He had been borrowing
money from the corporation since the 1950s. The balance of the
loan account was approximately $503,000 at the end of 1972 and
approximately $474,000 at the end of 1974. Hardee had never paid'
any interest on these loans. 2 The Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) increased Hardee's gross income by
$38,745.13 for 1973 and $37,775.70 for 1974, 3 asserting that
Hardee had received taxable benefits to this extent from the free
use of corporate funds. 4 The IRS assessed a tax deficiency of
$24,926.61 for 1973 and $24,675.02 for 1974.5 Hardee paid the
assessed deficiencies and brought suit in the United States Court of
Claims for the payments, claiming that the interest value of the
loans was nonincludable in the borrower's gross income. 6 The
court held that the value of an interest-free loan is includable in the
borrower's gross income. 7 Hardee v. United States, [1982] 2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9459 (Ct. Cl. 1982).8
1. Hardee v. United Staes, [1982] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84, 656 (Ct. Cl. 1982),
rev'd, 708 F. 2d 661, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Hardee owned 52% of the outstanding stock of Sea Gar-
den Sales Co., Inc. 1982-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84, 656 n. 1.
2. 1982-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84, 656 n.1.
3. Id. at 84,657, n.2. The government based these figures on a seven percent interest factor. Id.
4. Id. at 84,656-57.
5. Id. at 84,657.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 84,656.
8. Id. at 84,659. This was the only issue on which the Hardee court ruled. The court did not
address questions of valuation and timing but did order further proceedings to reduce Hardee's loan
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In the Hardee ruling the Court of Claims departed from twenty
years of case law. The Tax Court has considered the value of
interest-free loans to be nonincludable in income since the case of
Dean v. Commissioner9 first presented the issue. Nevertheless, the
IRS has continued to litigate the matter.
In Dean the Tax Court considered a series of cases involving
the recognition of income by a shareholder or employee through the
rent-free use of corporate property. 10 The Tax Court determined
that these cases were not controlling in the interest-free loan
situation. 11 The distinguishing factor was that interest on the use of
money is ordinarily deductible to the borrower, 12 whereas rent on
the use of property is not deductible. 13 If the taxpayer actually pays
rent to a corporation for the use of corporate property, the
payments are not deductible. 14 In contrast, if a borrower pays
interest to the corporation for the use of corporate funds, the
interest paid is deductible. 15
The rent-free use of property is analogous to receiving extra
compensation and immediately paying that amount back to the
corporation as rent. If the taxpayer actually receives an increase in
compensation and pays it back as rent, he would have extra income
but no extra deductions. 16 If the taxpayer pays the increase in
compensation back as interest, however, he would have a
deduction exactly offsetting and nullifying the increase in income. 17
This factor prompted the Tax Court to rule that the interest-free
use of corporate funds, unlike the rent-free use of corporate
property, results in no additional income to the borrower.18
The concurrence noted that it may be too broad a
balance for amounts attributable to salary. Id. at 84,660.
9. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). The facts in Dean were similar to those in Hardee. The taxpayers
recognized no income from their interest-free running loan accounts with a controlled corporation.
Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1087, 1090 (1961). The Dean court noted that the issue had its
origin in dictum from a memorandum opinion of the Tax Court involving a gift tax question
concerning the same taxpayers. Id. at 1089. The Tax Court commented that the interest-free lending
of funds might be a means of passing on earnings of the corporation in lieu of dividends to the extent
ofreasonable interest on the loans. Dean v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 314 (1960).
10. Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1089 (1961). The court cited a series of cases holding
that the value of a rent-free use ofcorporate property was includable in gross income. Id.
11. Id. at 1090.
12. Id. Section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for interest paid or accrued
in the taxable period. I.R.C. 5 163(a) (West 1983).
13. 35 T.C. at 1090. Rent on the use of property for personal use is not deductible. Rent is
deductible, however, on property used in business or for the production of income. See I.R.C. §§
212, 162(a) (West 1983).
14. 35 T.C. at 1090.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Dean court left this analogy to inference saying only that in the cases cited the
taxpayer would not have had a deduction for rent if he had paid it, whereas in the Dean case the
taxpayer would have had a deduction for interest if he had paid it, Id.
18. Id.
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generalization to state simply that an interest-free loan results in no
taxable gain to the borrower. 19 In some situations, the borrower
may not be entitled to the corresponding deduction that would
justify noninclusion. 20
Suttle v. Commissioner2" and Greenspun v. Commissioner22 refined
the rule of noninclusion further. In Greenspun the Tax Court held
Dean to be controlling and reiterated its position that interest-free
loans are distinguishable from rent-free uses of property. 23 The
Greenspun court reasoned that excluding the interest value of an
interest-free loan from income would equate the tax treatment of
the interest-free borrower with that of a similarly situated interest-
paying borrower. 24 For example, if an employee of a corporation
receives an increase in compensation of $1,000 and pays the
corporation $1,000 in interest on a loan from the corporation, he
would have extra income and a deduction of like amount. 25 The
transaction would be a wash. If another employee receives no extra
compensation but pays no interest on a similar loan from the
corporation, he is in the same economic position as the first
employee. 26 Receiving extra compensation and paying that amount
back as interest is economically equivalent to receiving no extra
compensation and paying no interest. 27 Since the transactions are
economically equivalent, the Tax Court stated that the tax law
should afford them the same treatment. 28
In Greenspun the Tax Court indicated that it might not follow
Dean when the nonrecognition rule would result in disparate tax
19. Id. at 1091 (Opper,J., concurring).
20. Id. The concurrence noted that interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry tax-
exempt securities is not deductible. I.R.C. 5 265(2) (West 1983). Because the facts of Dean did not
indicate that the taxpayer would not have had a deduction if he had actually paid interest, the
concurrence considered it unnecessary to decide the issue as broadly as the majority did. 35 T.C. at
1091 (Opper,J., concurring).
21. 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 1627 (1978), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). In Sulde the taxpayer
borrowed money interest-free from a closely held corporation. Suttle v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1627, 1628 (1978), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1127, 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). The Tax Court declined to
accept the Commissioner's assertion that the value of the loans was taxable, just as the value of a
rent-free use of property. 47 T.C.M. at 1628.
22. 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). In Greenspun the taxpayer received a
loan at a bargain rate of interest in return for giving the lender favorable press coverage in his
newspaper. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 934-35 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.
1982). The Tax Court held that the transaction resulted in no taxable income to the borrower. 72
T.C. at 946.
23. 72 T.C. at 946. Since the interest would have been deductible had the taxpayer paid it, the
court could find no reason to depart from Dean. Id. at 952.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 948.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Greenspun court reasoned that even though the parties eliminate the formalistic steps
of a corporation paying compensation to the borrower and the borrower, in turn, paying interest to
the corporation, the result should not change. Id. at 951.
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treatment among similarly situated taxpayers. 29 The purpose of the
Dean rule is to place the interest-free borrower in the same tax
position as though he had received extra compensation and paid
that amount back to the lending corporation as deductible
interest. 30 The deductibility of interest is the factor that justifies the
Dean rule and distinguishes interest-free loans from rent-free uses of
property. 31
If the interest would not be deductible had the taxpayer
actually paid it, there would be no basis for treating interest-free
loans differently from rent-free uses of corporate property. 32 For
example, if the taxpayer had used the loan proceeds to purchase or
carry tax-exempt securities, any interest paid on that loan would
not be deductible. 33 In that situation treating the interest-free
borrower as though he had received extra compensation and paid
deductible interest would imply to him a deduction he otherwise
would not have. 34 The Tax Court has not yet ruled on a case in-
volving such a situation. 35
Another area in which the Dean rule would lead to an
inequitable result is when the amount of a deduction depends on
the amount of adjusted gross income. 36 For example, the Internal
Revenue Code allows a medical deduction only to the extent that
deductible medical costs exceed five percent of adjusted gross
income. 37 Casualty losses are deductible only to the extent that the
loss exceeds ten percent of adjusted gross income. 38 The effect of
not imputing income equal to the value of a loan is to understate
29. Id. at 949-50.
30. Id. at 947-48.
31. Id. at 946.
32. Id. at 948.
33. Id. Interest paid on indebtedness to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities is not
deductible. I.R.C. § 265-1(a)(1) (West 1983). Interest paid on indebtedness incurred to carry a
single premium life insurance or endowment contract or a single premium annuity contract is also
not deductible. I.R.C. § 264-1(a) (West 1983). Interest may also be nondeductible under I.R.C.
§ 163, which limits the amount of investment interest that is deductible to the sum of $10,000, net
investment income, and excess deductions for business expenses, I.R.C. § 163 (d) (1) (West 1983).
The taxpayer in Hardee did carry tax-exempt securities during the loan period. This may have
been the reason the case was brought in the Court of Claims instead of the Tax Court, which
probably would have followed Dean. The taxpayer possible was concerned that the Tax Court would
depart from Dean when the taxpayer carries tax-exempt securities. See Hardee v. United States,
[1982] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 9459, at 84,656 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
34. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 949. Ifa taxpayer receives a salary of $1,000 from a corporation, pays
interest of $1,000 to a corporation, and uses the loan proceeds to purchase tax-exempt securities, he
will have taxable income of $1,000 and no interest deduction. Id. Under Dean the taxpayer will have
no taxable income from an interest-free loan regardless of what he does with the proceeds. Id. at 949-
50.
35. But see Baker v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 166, 172 (1980), aff'd, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982)
(mere simultaneous existence of the taxpayer's indebtedness and the ownership of tax-exempts was
not enough to establish that the taxpayer incurred the indebtedness to carry the tax-exempts.)
36. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 949.
37. I.R.C. § 213 (West 1983).
38. I.R.C. § 165-67 (West 1983).
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the interest-free borrower's adjusted gross income in relation to
that of his interest-paying counterpart. 39 Because the interest-free
borrower's adjusted gross income is smaller, his medical or casualty
loss deduction will be larger. As a result, the intefest-free borrower
would be allowed a greater deduction than if he had paid interest
and received extra compensation.40 It is in a situation such as this4 1
that the Greenspun court indicated that it might not follow Dean.42
One week after Greenspun the Tax Court applied the doctrine
of stare decisis in refusing to overrule Dean in Zager v.
Commissioner.43 The taxpayers in Zager, as controlling stockholders,
received interest-free loans on open accounts from a corporation. 4"
The Zager court held that the value of the loans was nonincludable
in gross income. 45 The Zager court noted that Dean had approved of
a corporate practice that had existed for forty-eight years prior to
Dean.46 The IRS had not challenged the holding in Dean until
twelve years later.47 The Zager court also noted that Congress was
considering legislation in the related area of taxation of fringe
benefits.4 8 Thus, the Zager court concluded that *a legislative
solution would be more appropriate than a judicial departure from
the current law.4 9
39. 72 T.C. at 949.
40. Id. Likewise, when a deduction cannot exceed a percentage of adjusted gross income, the
effect ofnoninclusion may be to decrease the amount of deductions available to a taxpayer and, thus,
increase his taxable income in relation to his interest-paying counterpart. For example, a deduction
for payments made to an individual retirement account cannot exceed the greater of S1,500 or 15 %
of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 219 (6) (1) (West 1983). Deductions for contributions to public
charities are limited to a percentage of adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. §5 170 (b) (1) (A); (b) (1)
(B); (b) (1) (C) (West 1983).
The foregoing examples do not apply, however, when the interest is deductible as an expense
from gross income rather than as a deduction from adjusted gross income. In this situation the
amount of the increase in adjusted gross income is offset by the interest deduction from gross income.
Adjusted gross income is thus left unaffected. See I.R.C. S 62(1) (West 1983). Note, however, that if
the interest would be deductible as a business expense, 5 482 may come into play to allow the IRS to
impute interest to the transaction. For a discussion of the relationship of § 482 to the interest-free
loan transaction, see infra notes 101-09.
41. Other disparities could result from the effective implication of a deduction. If a taxpayer
does not itemize deductions, noninclusion implies to him a deduction he would not otherwise have
because interest can be taken only as an itemized deduction. See I.R.C. § 163 (West 1983).
42. 72 T.C. at 950. In Greenspun the Tax Court stated, "Iwihen and if we are confronted
with such a case, we will decide at that time whether Dean is applicable, and if so, whether we shall
continue to adhere to our decision in Dean." Id.
43. 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), aff'dsub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1010 (1979).
45. Id.
46. Id at 1013. The Tax Court noted that the practice of a corporation giving interest-
free loans to its shareholders or employees has existed at least since the inception of our income tax
laws. Id.
47. Id. The commissioner did not announce his nonacquiescence in Dean until 1973. 1973-2
C.B. 4.
48. 72 T.C. at 1014. The Zager court noted that Congress forbade the promulgation of new
treasury regulations in the fringe benefit area for a limited time. Id. See Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996.
49. 72 T.C. at 1014. The Zager court said that the taxability of interest-free loans was
"sufficiently related to [the area of fringe benefits] that if a change is desired, a legislative solution
would appear to be more appropriate than ajudicial departure from the rule of stare decisis." Id.
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The federal appellate courts that have ruled on the issue have
upheld the Tax Court position of noninclusion. 50 Like the Zager
court, the federal courts have been unwilling to overrule such a
firmly established rule of tax law. 51
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code defines gross income
as all income from whatever source derived, unless specifically
exempted. 52 The courts have construed this language broadly to
include any economic benefit conferred, by whatever form. 53 Thus,
the economic benefit a shareholder or employee obtains from the
rent-free use of corporate property is includable in gross income. 54
The use of funds at no interest is an economic benefit just as is the
rent-free use of corporate property. 55
The Tax Court has refused to recognize the benefit of an
interest-free loan as income because there is ordinarily a deduction
available that would, if paid, offset the amount of the benefit in
taxable income. 56 The availability of a deduction is a consideration
in determining whether an item is to be taken into income. 57 For
example, the receipt of a receivable that a taxpayer had previously
written off as a bad debt is includable in gross income precisely
because the taxpayer took a deduction for that item in a prior
period. 58 Thus, the relationship of a benefit to a deduction may
affect the quality of a benefit as income. 59
50. Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (there is a longstanding
precedent against treating interest-free loans as a taxable event); Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d
408, 409 (6th Cir. 1982) (the Dean rule of noninclusion is a well-established principle of law that
should not be changed by the courts); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1982)
(reversal of the Dean rule would inject nonuniformity into our national tax law); Commissioner v.
Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1982) (Congress, not the courts, is the proper body to
modify the Dean rule); Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1981) (to depart from
Dean would result in uncertainty and the uneven application of the tax law); Martin v.
Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981) (modification of the Dean rule would result in a
loss of national uniformity in the application of our tax law); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127,
1128 (4th Cir. 1980) (interest-free loans from a corporation result in no income to the borrower).
51. See, e.g., Greenspun, 670 F.2d at 126. In Greenspun the Ninth Circuit Court stated that "[t]oo
much water has passed under the bridge to warrant judicial re-examination [of Dean]." Id. at 125-26.
52. I.R.C. S 61(a) (West 1983).
53. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 180-88 (1945) (the difference in value of an employee
stock option price and the market price of the stock at the time of exercise of the option is an item of
income).
54. Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1980) (rental value of company-
provided car includable in income); Walker v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1966)
(rental value of company-owned house includable in taxpayer's income).
55. See Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 947.
56. Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961). That interest is deductible and rent is
not distinguishes interest-free loans from rent-free uses of property. Id.
57. Zager, 72 T.C. at 1012. The Zager court stated, "[I]t is not accurate to suggest that the
availability of a related deduction is wholly irrelevant in determining whether the benefit involved
should be treated as realized income." Id. n.1.
58. Id. The tax benefit rule of § 111 provides generally that recovery of a previously written-off
bad debt is includable in gross income in the year received to the extent that the item resulted in a
prior reduction of tax. I.R.C. § 111 (West 1983).
59. Zager, 72 T.C. at 1012.
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The Tax Court analysis does not impute both income and a
corresponding deduction equal to the interest value of the loan in
arriving at no net taxable gain. Rather, the Tax Court position did
not recognize this benefit in income at the outset because of the
deductible feature of interest. 60
In taking this approach, the Tax Court avoids the problem of
construing section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code. 61 Section 163
only allows a deduction for interest that the taxpayer pays or
accrues. 62 The interest-free borrower does not pay or accrue any
interest. Because the tax law only allows a deduction where there is
a clear statutory provision, 63 the interest-free borrower cannot have
an imputed deduction for interest that he does not pay or accrue.
Sections 163 and 61, when read together, would demand the
recognition of income but disallow the imputation of a deduction. 64
Had Dean and its progeny included the value of an interest-free loan
in gross income, the paid or accrued language of section 163 would
have precluded allowing a corresponding deduction. 65 This was the
inequitable result the Dean court sought to avoid. 66
The unexpressed fear of the Tax Court in being bound to a
strict construction of section 163 is not without authority. The
United States Supreme Court has said that economic equivalence is
not a valid reason for allowing a deduction. 67 Rather, a statute
must make an express provision before a taxpayer may take a
deduction. 68
An exception to a strict reading of section 163 may not,
60. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 946. The Tax Court position can be characterized as the no-income,
no-deduction rule. The Greenspun court stated that the result of no net taxable gain to the interest-free
borrower was not based on the imputing of income and deduction of like amount. Id. Rather, it "was
based on the conclusion that an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower." Id.
(citing Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090).
61. I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1983). Section 163 states, "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year of indebtedness." Id.
62. Id.
63. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1974). The Supreme
Court stated that deductions are allowed only as there is "clear provision therefor." Id. at 148.
64. Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans from Corporations to Shareholders and From
Employers to Employees, 19 B.C.L. REv. 231, 238 (1978). The commentator explains the Dean analysis
as attempting to reach the equitable result of similar tax treatment of economically equivalent
situations by not including the value ofthe interest-free loan in gross income. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134 (1974). A corporation issued
$50 face amount bonds to retire its outstanding preferred stock, which had a market value of $33 per
share. Id. at 139-40. The corporation sought to take a deduction for this difference in value, $50 -
$33, because the transaction was equivalent to selling the bonds for $33 and retiring the stock at that
price. Id. at 148. Because no real costs were paid or incurred, the Supreme Court denied the
deduction. Id. at 148-49.
68. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the economic equivalence argument stating that the
taxability of a transaction does not depend on whether another form of the transaction would have
been nontaxable. Id.
1983]
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however, be contrary to accepted judicial standards of
construction. 69 A dissenting opinion in Martin v. Commissioner7°
criticized the government's position as unjust and not mandated by
the language of the tax code. 71 It also characterized the Dean
rationale as achieving overkill in its analysis. 72 The view advocated
by the Martin dissent would include the value of an interest-free
loan in gross income in all cases. The taxpayer would then take an
imputed deduction for that amount if he would have had a
deduction had he actually paid interest to the corporation. 73 This
reading of section 163 admittedly stretches the words "paid or
accrued" beyond their literal meaning. The justification for this
interpretation is that a court has a duty to give the tax code a
quality of rationality. 74 The tax law would, thus, treat like
situations alike. To do otherwise would be neither equitable nor'
rational. 75
Revenue Ruling 73-1376 is an example of the IRS giving the
statutes an expanded meaning to allow a deduction when it would
be unjust not to do so. In Revenue Ruling 73-13 an executive
received company-paid financial services. 77 The IRS ruled that the
executive had received income equal to the value of the services,
but that he could also take a deduction for that very amount. 78 This
was so even though the executive did not pay or incur any expense,
which the wording of the statute required. 79 Because the taxpayer
did not pay or incur the expense but was allowed a deduction, the
ruling supports the view of the Martin dissent that would allow an
imputed interest deduction. 80
69. Keller, supra note 64, at 241. The commentator believes the phrase "paid or accrued" of
S 163 should be applied flexibly to achieve a rational tax result. See infra notes 78-86 and
accompanying text for examples ofnonliteral constructions of similar provisions.
70. 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg,J., dissenting).
71. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg,J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1142. The dissent stated that Dean, as applied by the majority in Martin, would allow
an effective implied interest deduction even when the interest would not be deductible if paid. Id.
The dissent commented, "[T]he Dean court's overkill has been transformed into mass annihilation
by the majority opinion." Id.
73. Id. The dissent stated that an imputed deduction approach would tax like situations alike in
all cases involving a loan from a corporation. Id.
74. Id. at 1143. The dissent in Martin noted that the courts should give a logical and sensible
interpretation to the tax code when faced with a situation not contemplated by the drafters of the
code. Id. n.17.
75. Id. at 1144.
76. Rev. Rul. 13, 1973-1 C.B. 42.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id. I.R.C. S 212 allows a deduction for expenses paid or incurred for tax or investment
counsel. I.R.C. § 212 (West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1960). Although § 212 uses the words
"paid or incurred" rather than "paid or accrued" as § 163 does, there would seem to be little
significance in distinguishing these words as a matter of construction. See DeSoto Securities Co. v.
Commissioner, 235 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1956) ("accrued" relates to the incidence of a tax or
interest obligation while "incurred" relates to the incidence of any other obligation).
80. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1143 n.17 (1981) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). In
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Offered as another example of a nonliteral reading of the
Internal Revenue Code is the assigning of a cost basis to property
acquired at no cost. 81 A taxpayer's basis in such property is the
amount at which he takes the property into income.8 2 The legal
fiction that assigns a cost basis to property acquired at no cost gives
an expanded meaning to the word "cost" in section 1012 to achieve
an equitable result.8 3 The Martin dissent would expand the words
"paid or accrued" in section 163 for the same reason.8 4 The Tax
Court obtains the same result as the Martin dissent without reaching
the problem of construing the language of section 163.
The Court of Claims in Hardee rejected both the rationale and
result of the Tax Court.85 First, the Hardee court asserted that the
value of an interest-free loan is an economic benefit, just as is the
rent-free use of property. The tax law regards such a benefit as
income.8 6 That interest is deductible, which was considered the
dispositive factor in Dean, did not affect the initial determination in
Hardee that the benefit from an interest-free loan is an item of gross
income within the meaning of section 61.87
The Hardee court, after determining that the benefit was
includable in gross income, declined to impute a corresponding
deduction.8 8 The court read the "paid or accrued" language of
Greenspun the Tax Court noted that even though the Revenue Ruling approach differs in imputing
both income and deduction, when the Tax Court would impute neither, the two situations reach the
same result and are indistinguishable in principle. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 952
(1979).
81. See Brown, The Growing 'Common Law' of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1961). The
author hypothesizes the situation in which a taxpayer wins a car that has a fair market value of
$5,000 in a lottery. This results in income to the taxpayer of $5,000. If he sells the car, his basis for
determining gain on the sale is not his cost, which was the price of the lottery ticket. Id. at 239. His
cost basis is the amount at which he took the car into income - $5,000. The term "cost" is
"stretched out of recognizable shape" to give the tax code a "quality of rationality." Id. at 240.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a taxpayer's basis in property is its cost. I.R.C. 1012
(West 1983).
82. Smith v. Russell, 76 F.2d 91, 92 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denid, 296 U.S. 614 (1936)
(employee's basis in property that is acquired as compensation is the amount of income resulting
from the receipt of the item). The Internal Revenue Code provides that a shareholder's basis in
property received as a property dividend is its fair market value at the time of the distribution.
I.R.C. § 301(d) (West 1983). Property received in return for services has a cost basis of its fair
market value at the time of receipt. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (1960).
83. Keller, supra note 64, at 241-42. The commentator cites the example given by Brown, supra
note 81, at 239-40 to be the law treating the transaction as though the taxpayer had received cash
from the lottery of $5,000 and purchased the car for $5,000. The law should likewise expand the
words "paid or accrued" to treat the interest-free borrower as though he had received cash
compensation or dividends and paid interest. Keller, supra note 64 at 241-42.
84. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg,J., dissenting).
85. Hardee v. United States, f 1982] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19459, at 84, 658 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
86. Id. In Hardee the Court of Cliims considered it beyond dispute that an interest-free loan
constitutes a benefit that is includable in gross income. Id. Concerning this contention, the Hardee
court stated, "[I]n truth, the Tax Court has never said otherwise." Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 84,659. In refusing to impute a deduction, the Hardee court noted that it is an
"established principle that tax consequences should be gauged according to the facts as they are,"
and not as they might have been. Id.
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section 163 strictly to preclude a deduction when a taxpayer had
not actually paid or accrued any interest. 89
The Hardee court stated further that even if it could impute an
offsetting interest deduction, it would not make economic sense to
do so. 9° The interest-free borrower avoids the borrowing costs that
an interest-paying borrower must pay. 91 Thus, he has an economic
benefit that his interest-paying counterpart does not have. 92 The
taxpayer should include this benefit in income. 93 To exclude the
interest value of the loan from income places the interest-free
borrower in a better economic position than his interest-paying
counterpart. 94
In Hardee the government applied a seven percent interest
factor to arrive at an interest-not-charged figure. 95 Hardee did not
contend that a different rate would have been a more proper basis
of valuation. 96 The government's position has been that the
taxpayer's individual borrowing rate determines the value of the
interest-free loan. 97
A basic problem in this approach is the difficulty of finding the
taxpayer's individual rate. 98 When the taxpayer can borrow money
from a financial institution, the IRS can determine an interest
factor by reference to the lending rate of the institution at the time
of the loan. When the taxpayer can obtain a loan in the open
market only at a usurious rate of interest, the bank rate would not
89. Id. The Hardee court cited Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134,
148-49 (1974), as being dispositive of the core issue of whether a taxpayer could take an interest
deduction when he incurred no cost of borrowing. Id. The Supreme Court held that he could not. See
supra notes 67-68 for a discussion of the facts of National Alfalfa Dehydrating. It is arguable whether the
dictum cited from NationalAlfalfa Dehydrating should apply beyond its exact facts. The Supreme Court
limited its holding to the narrow issue of whether amortizable discount arises from a pre-1969
exchange of debt for outstanding preferred stock of the issuing corporation. 417 U.S. at 147. For a
discussion of the case, see Note, The Original Issue Discount Deduction in Bonds-for-Non-Cash Property
Exchanges, 27 VANS. L. Rev. 1179, 1201-05 (1974). The relevance of the case is that the Supreme
Court would not allow an interest deduction when the taxpayer incurred no real costs of borrowing.
417 U.S. at 154-55.
90. Hardee v. United States, [198212 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,659 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
91. Id.
92. Id. The Hardee court noted that to the interest-free borrower under the Dean rule "the
borrowing is truly 'free.' "Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Hardee court did not believe it was valid to equate actual expenditures with
payments-in-kind. Id.
95. Id. at 84,657 n.2.
96. Id. The parties stipulated that a seven percent rate was proper. Brief for the United States to
the TrialJudge at 6, Hardee v. United States, [1982] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,656 (Ct.
Cl. 1982).
97. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123, 124 (9th Cir. 1982) (government
asserted that the applicable rate was that at which the taxpayer could have borrowed a like sum from
a commercial lending institution).
98. Keller, supra note 64, at 257-58. A borrower's individual rate may vary depending on, for
example, the value of security given and the borrower's credit rating. See Rev. Rul. 61, 1973-1 C.B.
408.409.
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accurately measure the value of the loan to the taxpayer. 99 The
taxpayer's actual borrowing rate would impute to him an amount
of income greater than the market value of the loan. 100
Reference to the Internal Revenue Code may provide a
solution to the problem. The Internal Revenue Code provides a
statutory rate in cases in which the Commissioner may impute
interest, thus avoiding the problem of determining an individual
rate. Sections 482 and 483 of the Internal Revenue Code allow the
Commissioner to impute interest to certain transactions to more
properly reflect income. 101 Under section 482 the Commissioner
may impute a twelve percent per annum simple interest rate to
loans made between controlled business organizations.10 2 Section
483 allows the allocation of interest among payments made in a
deferred payment sale or exchange of property. 10 3 The current
section 483 rate is ten percent compounded semi-annually. 10 4
Section 482 limits the Commissioner's authority to transactions
among commonly controlled organizations. 10 5  Section 483 is
likewise inapplicable here, because no property is being sold or
exchanged. 0 6 The IRS has not argued by analogy to sections 482
and 483 because they generally allow as a deduction the amount of
interest imputed as income. 107
99. See O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. Rav. 1085, 1090 (1974). The
commentator questioned which rate the IRS would impute when the taxpayer could not obtain a
loan in the open market at any rate. Id. The author noted that it is not reasonable to measure the
value of a loan by reference to the rate of a loanshark. Id.
100. The market value, or bank rate, of a loan, unlike the rental value of property, will vary
with each individual. The result is that different taxpayers receiving the same loan amounts will take
different amounts into income, depending on their individual borrowing rate. Differing tax
treatment of similarly situated interest-free borrowers would result from imputing to each taxpayer a
different rate. This may be an area of concern because it is incompatible with the goal of uniformity
in the application of the tax law. See Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 1981) (to
overrule Dean would result in uneven application of the tax law).
101. I.R.C. 5§ 482,483 (West 1983).
102. Id. 5 482. The IRS will impute an arm's length interest rate to loans carrying a rate of less
than 11% or greater than 13% made between commonly controlled organizations. An arm's length
rate for purposes of 5 482 is currently set at 12% unless the taxpayer can establish that a different rate
is more appropriate. Treas. Reg. 5 1.482-2(a)(2)(iii)(B)(2) (1982).
103. I.R.C. 5 483 (West 1983).
104. Treas. Reg. 5 1.483-1(c)(2)(ii)(C) (1982).
105. Treas. Reg. 55 1.482-1(a)(1), -2(b)(2) (1982). The regulations give a broad construction to
the term "organizations" so that 5 482 could be applicable to an interest-free loan transaction if the
borrower is a business, trust, estate, or association controlled by the same interests'as the lender.
Roth, Can A Lender Be Charged With Receiving Taxable Income as a Result of an Interest-Free Loan, 52 J.
TAx'N, 136, 137 (1980).
106. Roth, supra note 105, at 136.
107. Commerce Clearing House, Income Generated by Interest-Free Loans: Court of Claims, [1982] 10
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8199, at 75,262 (July 28, 1982). Another reason the IRS has not argued by
analogy to 55 482 and 483 may be that the sections illustrate the concept that the IRS cannot take it
upon itself to develop anti-interest-free loan laws. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted
that the courts refused to impute interest to 55 482 and 483 transactions until the promulgation of
Treas. Reg. 5 1.482 and enactment of § 483. Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 240 (7th Cir.
1978).
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Since Hardee did not contend that a different rate should have
been used, the Court of Claims accepted the government's method
of valuation. 08 Given the difficulties in assigning an individualized
rate and the government's practice of imputing a rate set by federal
regulations to certain transactions, it would seem preferable that
courts adopting the Hardee position apply a rate established under
sections 482 or 483.109
The question of when to include the value of an interest-free
loan in income presents little trouble in cases such as Hardee in
which the note is payable on demand. The economic benefit is the
use of the funds over the loan period. 110 Thus, the taxpayer should
recognize income during each period in which the funds are
outstanding. 1
The matter is less clear when a note with a fixed date of
repayment is given in exchange for the loan. A fixed date note,
unlike a demand note, has a present value of less than the face
amount of the note. 112 The taxpayer receives funds in exchange for
a note that, in present value, is worth less than the amount of the
loan. In such cases, the IRS has taken the position that the amount
that should be taken into income is the difference between the loan
proceeds and present value of the note given in exchange.1' 3 The
reasoning is that the taxpayer is realizing the benefit of the
transaction in the year in which the loan is made, because he is
receiving funds in return for a note that is worth less than the
amount of the funds. 114
This immediate recognition approach has been accepted in
other areas of taxation. A federal appellate court has applied a
present value analysis in considering the deductibility of a
108. Hardee v. United States, [1982] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,657 n.2 (Ct.
Cl. July 6, 1982).
109. See Keller, supra note 64, at 257. The author believes that applying a rate specified in the
treasury regulations would avoid the procedural complexities of an individualized rate. Id.
110. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 951 (1979).
111. Id. For example, if the loan amount is $1,000, and the assessed interest factor is 10%, the
taxpayer would recognize $100 each year in which the loan is outstanding. Id.
112. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 1978). The right to receive money
at a certain future date has a market value determined by discounting the note to its present value.
The present value of a demand note, however, is equal to its face value, because it is payable on
demand rather than at some future time. Id. Further, absent a definite date of repayment, a present
discounted value approach cannot determine the value of a note. Id.
113. See Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 950. The taxpayer in Greenspun received a loan at three percent
interest payable eight years from the date of issuance. Id. at 936. The government asserted that the
taxpayer should recognize the benefit of the bargain rate in the year of receipt of the proceeds. Id. at
950. The IRS computed the benefit of the bargain interest rate by summing the present values of the
differences between the actual interest payments made at the three percent rate and the payments
that would have been made at the market rate. This sum is the value of the preferential rate of
interest. Id. at 950-51.
114. Id.
[VOL. 59:645
1983] CASE COMMENT 657
charitable contribution. In Mason v. United States1 15 a taxpayer
transferred property to a charitable organization in exchange for a
note that had a present value that was less than the fair market
value of the property. The Seventh Circuit in Mason allowed a
charitable deduction for this difference in value in the year of the
transfer. 116 The Tax Court also has applied to present value
analysis in finding a taxable gift equal to the difference between the
value of property transferred and the present value of a note given
in exchange for the property. 117 The Tax Court has rejected this
analysis, however, in a gift tax case involving the transfer of an in-
terest-free loan.1 18
The Tax Court has indicated that the taxpayer should
recognize the benefit of an interest-free loan, if at all, ratably over
the loan period even if the note given bears a fixed date of
repayment. 119 Realization of the benefit from the use of funds
occurs during each period in which the taxpayer uses the funds.
120
Since interest is thought of as a charge on the use of money, the
taxpayer should allocate the benefit of not paying that charge over
the years in which he uses the money. 121 This type of allocation
115. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975). The note received by the taxpayer in Mason had a face value of
$112,689.42 and an appraised fair value of $81,000. The taxpayer received this note and $4,507.50
cash in exchange for property worth $117,000. Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25, 29 (7th Cir.
1975). The Mason court allowed a charitable deduction for the $31,492.50 difference in values. Id.
116. Id. The amount of the deduction was the difference in values between the property given
and the consideration received in exchange. Id.
117. Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). When the taxpayer exchanged property
for an annuity, the Tax Court found a taxable gift equal to the difference between the value of the
property and the present value ofthe annuity. Id. at 207.
118. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); contra
Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (1982). The taxpayer in Crown made interest-free loans to
family members on open accounts and demand notes. 67 T.C. at 1060-61. The Tax Court refused to
find a taxable gift in the granting of these loans. 67 T.C. at 1065. On appeal the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that I.R.C. § 2512 taxes the difference in values of property given and
consideration received for the property. 585 F.2d at 238. The activity that § 2512 taxes differs from
the activity to which the tax on income applies. The benefit of an interest-free loan is the use of funds
for the loan period. It is the use of funds, rather than the exchange of a promissory note for funds, to
which § 61 applies. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 951 (1979).
119. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 950-51. The Greenspun court noted that the economic benefit that the
government sought to tax was the use of funds at a low rate or no rate of interest. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. An analogous situation is the rule that allows an accrual basis taxpayer who buys a
noninterest-bearing note at a discount to allocate the discount over the term of the note. See Vancoh
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 918 (1936). An accrual basis taxpayer who buys a nonin-
terest-bearing note at a discount recognizes interest income ratably as the discount is earned.
Id. On the cash basis, however, the taxpayer includes the discount in income when he receives the
loan proceeds because a cash basis taxpayer recognizes income in the year of actual or constructive
receipt. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1(a), -1 (c)(1)(i); 1.451-2 (1977).
Both accrual basis and cash basis taxpayers recognize prepaid interest income in the year of
receipt. Id. § 1.451-1(a). If the benefit of an interest-free loan is the value of receiving funds to be
repaid at a future date, the prepaid interest rules would seem especially relevant. The borrower
receives the benefit in cash in the year of the loan, and this is analogous to receiving a cash
prepayment of interest. The Tax Court, however, does not consider the benefit to be the initial
receipt of funds, but the use of funds over the loan period. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 950.
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would prevent a material distortion of income.1 22
The Hardee position of inclusion further raises the question of
how the benefit accruing from an interest-free loan should be
classified. The income attributable to the taxpayer in Hardee was
dividend income 123  rather than compensation. 124 A corporate
distribution in-kind of property or services may be a constructive
dividend. 125 Constructive dividends possess the same tax attributes
as actual dividend distributions.1 26 They are taxable only to the
extent that the corporation has existing earnings and profits. 127 To
the extent that the value of the distribution exceeds existing
earnings and profits, the distribution is a return of capital rather
than income. 28 Dividend income arising from a rent-free use of
property is also subject to limitation by the corporation's earnings
and profits. 29 Dividend income arising from an interest-free loan,
since it is a rent-free use of money, should be subject to the same
rules. 30 The necessary conclusion is that the receipt of an interest-
free loan may not always result in income under Hardee but may be
122. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 956 (Goffe, J., concurring). The Greenspun concurrence cited two
cases that dealt with the deduction side of prepaid interest: Resnick v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1977) (prepayment of four year's interest disallowed as a deduction because it would
materially distort income) and Sandor v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976) (a prepayment
of live years of prepaid interest disallowed as a deduction because it would materially distort
income).
123. Brief for the United States to the Trial Judge at 10, Hardee v. United States, [19821 2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,656 (Ct. Cl. 1982). The IRS treated the benefit
as a dividend from Sea Garden Sales Co., Inc. to Hardee. Id. The classification of the benefit as
dividend income rather than compensation is important because the items carry different tax
treatment. For example, under I.R.C. 5 116 an individual may exclude from gross income the first
$100 of dividends received from a domestic corporation during the taxable year. I.R.C. 5 116(a)(West 1983). Dividend income, unlike compensation, is investment income for purposes of
computing the investment interest deduction. I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 1983).
124. Id. An economic benefit is compensation to the extent that it is received for services
rendered. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1983). A concurrence in Greenspun indicated that the benefit of an
interest-free loan may be more properly includable in income, if at all, under the broad
compensation provisions of I.R.C. 5 61 rather than under the specific provisions of the I.R.C.
concerning dividends. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 957 (1979) (Goffe, J.,
concurring).
125. WEST'S FEDERAL TAxATION 137 (W. Hoffman ed. 1981). The rent-free use of corporate
property by a shareholder is a constructive dividend to the shareholder in the amount of the fair
rental value of the property for the period of the use. Id.
126. Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869, 877 (8th Cir. 1957) (corporate income diverted
directly to shareholders held to be dividend income and, thus, subject to the rules regarding
corporate distributions generally).
127. I.R.C. §5 301(c), 316(a) (West 1983). When a corporation makes a distribution to its
shareholders, the amount that is dividend income may not exceed current and accumulated earnings
and profits. Treas. Reg. 5 1.316-1(a) (1983).
128. I.R.C. § 301(c) (West 1983). The amount of a distribution that is not income reduces the
recipient's basis in his stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1983).
129. Grant v. United States, [1976] 38 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 5203, at 5694 (E.D. Ark. May 14,
1976). In Grant the value of a rent-free use of property in excess of corporate earnings and profits was
a return of capital that reduced the shareholders' basis in their stock. Id. at 5696.
130. See Keller, supra note 64, at 233 n.13. The author asserts that the corporate lender should
recognize income equal to the value of the loan as though it had received interest payments from the
borrower and paid cash dividends. Presumably, under this approach earnings and profits would be




treated as a capital distribution.
The Court of Claims decision in Hardee has been reversed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 131 If the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is appealed, the longevity of the Dean rule as an
administrative practice could encourage even the Supreme Court
to defer resolution of the matter to Congress. 132 Taxpayers have
relied on the nontaxability of interest-free loans since the inception
of the income tax laws.133 To overrule Dean would result in
potentially far-reaching consequences. 134
The Greenspun court stated that if the tax law as it relates to
interest-free loans should be changed, the change should come from
Congress. 135 The Supreme Court has noted that the courts should
not readily undertake to change established rules of taxation. If a
change in the tax law is desired, Congress is better equipped to
enact a change. 136
Congress has been reluctant to enact changes in the judicial
handling of fringe benefits such as interest-free loans. Congress
undertook a review of fringe benefits in 1977. Congress issued and
extended until 1980 an enactment forbidding the IRS from
promulgating new regulations in the area. 137 This moratorium was
extended to December 31, 1983.138 The Senate Appropriations
Committee has urged the IRS to refrain from instituting cases
asserting the taxability of the value of interest-free loans. 139
Congress has since failed to legislate in the area of interest-free
loans. In Hardee the Court of Claims, although reluctant to make
uncertain two decades of case law, would not adopt a view it
considered to be wrong. 140 Currently, Hardee stands alone in its
opposition to the Dean rule, partly because of the judiciary's
reluctance to sanction such a drastic change in the tax law. Hardee
131. Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
132. Commerce Clearing House, Income Generated by Interest-Free Loans: Court of Claims, [1982] 10
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8199, at 75,262 (July 28, 1982).
133. Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1013 (1979).
134. Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1982).
135. Id.
136. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972). The decision in Byrum was that a settlor
of a trust who retained broad management powers did not retain rights that would subject the trust
corpus to the federal estate tax. Id. at 150. The Supreme Court noted that taxpayers had relied on
this rule since 1929. Id. at 133.
137. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 1,92 Stat. 996.
138. Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 5801, 95 Stat. 349.
139. S. REP. No. 955, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1980).
140. Hardee v. United States, [1982] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,658 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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illustrates the need for a final and uniform resolution of the
problem, whether it be by judicial or legislative means.
ROGER A. ROYSE
